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Abstract
In this paper we estimate an average-cost function for a panel of 45 Swiss
electricity distribution utilities as a basis for yardstick regulation of the
distribution-network access prices. Unlike the existing literature, we separate the
electricity sales function of utilities from the network operation function. Several
exogenous variables measuring the heterogeneity of the service areas were
included in the model specification in order to allow the regulator to set
differentiated benchmark prices incorporating this heterogeneity. We can identify
different exogenous service area characteristics that affect average cost. These are
the load factor, the customer density and the output density of different consumer
groups. Moreover, the estimation results indicate the existence of significant
economies of scale; i.e. most of the Swiss utilities in our sample are too small to
reach minimum efficient scale. However, to give the small utilities incentives to
merge the size of the utilities must not be included in the yardstick calculation.
1. Introduction
The privatization and the deregulation of the electric power sector have been
introduced in many countries, including England, Norway, Chile and New
Zealand. In Switzerland, as in other European countries, several proposals exist to
institute changes in the electricity market and therefore move to competition. All
these proposals contain as a central element of the reform the introduction of third
party access (TPA). With the introduction of TPA, the electricity distribution
utilities are obliged to allow nondiscriminatory access to companies that wish to
transmit electricity over the utility’s transmission and distribution lines for sale at
the final consumer level.
As a result, the distribution utilities at the local level, which are the object of our
study, must separate their different functions: the delivery of electricity
(distribution) and the retail sale of electricity (supply). Because the electricity
distribution utilities will still have a monopoly franchise to deliver electricity
within their service territories, a rate regulation by the regulatory commission is
necessary. Otherwise, the distribution utilities could raise the rates above what
they would be in a competitive market. This raises the problem of determining
proper rates for the delivery of electricity at the local level. On the one hand,
prices should be high enough to guarantee the viability of regulated firm, on the
other hand, prices that are set too high cause welfare losses. Because of
asymmetric information, the regulator does not know the firm’s true costs. High
costs may be due to the firm’s particular production situation or just because of its
inefficiency.
Traditional regulation does not take into account the problem of inefficiency of
regulated firms. Rate-of-return or cost-of-service regulation typically allows firms
to set prices that cover all of costs, but no incentives for efficient production are
given. In recent years, price-cap regulation, which gives firms better incentives for
efficient production, is used to regulate natural monopolies (see Laffont and
Tirole, 1993). The regulator sets a price cap (or price path) that will not be
changed for a regulatory period (usually several years). However, due to the
imperfect information available to the regulator there are problems with price-cap
regulation, too. First, if price caps are set too high there is the possibility of a
typical situation of deadweight loss. Second, the regulating authority might have a
credibility or commitment problem if regulated firms are not viable due to price-
caps that are set very low. Third, under price-cap regulation the regulator has only
limited possibilities to react to general shocks that influence costs of all regulated
firms in the same way.
Shleifer (1985) proposed yardstick competition in terms of price to regulate local
monopolies producing a homogeneous good. The regulated price for the
individual firms depends on the average costs of identical firms. Shleifer shows
that under ideal circumstances it is the dominant strategy for each firm to choose
the socially efficient level of cost reduction. Yardstick competition can also be
used to set the informational basis for a more effective price-cap regulation
because it reduces the informational asymmetries between firms and regulator
regarding costs. It has the additional advantage of taking into account general
shocks that might cause problems in a pure price-cap regulation.
The yardstick competition concept can also be applied to firms that are producing
heterogeneous outputs if these outputs only differ in observable characteristics. To
correct the yardstick for the heterogeneity the regulator can use a multivariate
estimation of an average cost function.1 The observable characteristics are
included as explanatory variables and will in that way correct for cost differences
that are only due to the heterogeneity of output. Only exogenous heterogeneity
factors that cannot be altered by the distribution utilities must therefore be
incorporated in the yardstick regulation. The regulator sets, then, corrected
yardstick prices for the individual firms that incorporate their heterogeneity.
The purpose of this paper is to make a contribution to the debate on access pricing
of the distribution network. We suggest that yardstick regulation should be used to
regulate prices for TPA to the distribution network. Because of the heterogeneity
of electricity distribution we follow Shleifer’s suggestion to estimate a
multivariate average cost function that could be employed by the regulatory
commission to benchmark network access prices at the distribution level. In the
empirical part we use a panel of Swiss electricity distribution utilities to estimate
an average cost function and emphasize the incorporation of service area
characteristics to correct the yardsticks for influences due to the heterogeneity of
output.
The article is organized as follows. In the next section an average cost function for
electricity distribution that takes into account the heterogeneity of the output is
suggested. After that the data base for the estimation of the average cost function
is presented. The estimation results follow in section 4 and are complemented by
the analysis of economies of density and scale. Section 5 shows how the results
could be used to regulate the electricity distribution by yardstick competition.
Section 6 reports the conclusions.
2. Specification of an Average Cost Function
The estimation of cost functions in the electricity distribution industry are well
documented in empirical research cf. Neuberg (1977) and Pollitt (1995) for the
estimation of average cost functions and Nelson and Primeaux (1988), Salvanes
and Tjøtta (1994), Burns and Weyman-Jones (1996), Filippini (1996), Hayashi,
Goo, and Chamberlain (1997) and Filippini (1998) for the estimation of total cost
functions. All of these studies estimated cost functions which also include the
expenditure for purchasing electricity in the total costs. As a result, these studies
do not separate the electricity purchasing function of a utility from the network
operation function and, therefore, are not ideal for benchmarking network access
prices.
To overcome this problem we suggest in this study a very simple unbundling of
costs between the network activities and the purchasing activities: only the costs
of  electricity purchasing belong to the supply, all the other costs belong to the
network. This seems a reasonable approach because the supply activities in
comparison to the network operation need only a limited amount of resources in
terms of labor and capital. In addition, this simple unbundling mechanism
considers the fact that the regulator is subject to asymmetric information and
normally can not observe subcosts.
The costs of operating a distribution system are the costs of building and
maintaining the system of service lines, mains and transformers, and of measuring
and billing electricity. Burns and Weyman-Jones (1996) draw up a comprehensive
list of the factors these costs may depend upon:
(a) the maximum demand on the system;
(b) the total number of customers served;
(c) the type of consumer;
(d) the dispersion of the consumers;
(e) the size of the distribution area;
(f) the total kWh sold;
(g) system security;
(h) the length of distribution line and
(i) the transformer capacity.
However, the last two factors, the length of the distribution line and the
transformer capacity, are inputs rather than output characteristics and therefore
should not be included in the model. Moreover, Shleifer emphasized that only
“observable characteristics that cannot be altered by the firm” should be used to
model the heterogeneity of output. To overcome serious multicollinearity
problems,2 we are incorporating the different effects suggested by Burns and
Weyman-Jones mostly in terms of relative rather than absolute variables.
In our model we distinguish three different network levels (high, medium, and
low voltage). The main output is kWh transported on the medium-voltage grid.
Additional variables for the high- and low-voltage grid are included. Maximum
demand is embodied in form of the load factor (LF), which is the relation between
average and maximum demand. To account for the heterogeneity of consumers
we differentiate between two customer groups (medium- and low-voltage
customers) with their respective average consumption levels. The dispersion of
consumers and the size of the service area are combined in the customer-density
variable. System security should also be used as an output indicator.
Unfortunately,  we are not able to include system security variables in our
specification because no data are available.
The inputs to the operation of the distribution system consist primarily of labor
and capital. Assuming that output and input prices are exogenous, and that (for a
given technology) firms adjust input levels so as to minimize costs of distribution,
the firm's total average cost of operating the electricity distribution system can be
represented by the average cost function
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where C represents total cost, AC represents total average cost per kWh and Y is
the output represented by the total number of kWh transported on the medium-
voltage grid. PL, and PC are the prices of labor and capital, respectively. SLT
represents the share of electricity that is delivered on the low-voltage network.
This variable considers the differences among the utilities in terms of customer
structure. HVG is a dummy variable to separate distribution utilities which are
also operating a high-voltage grid.3  OTSH is a variable used to control for outputs
other than the distribution of electricity that are included in the accounting data of
electric utilities.4 We use the share of other revenues on total revenues as output
indicator for these activities. LF is the load factor and CD is the customer density
measured in customers per hectare. ODL and ODM are respectively the average
consumption per low and medium voltage customers, which we label output
densities. T is a time trend introduced to take into account technological progress.
Using a linear function, equation (1) can be approximated by the following
average cost function:
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The output Y is included in linear and quadratic form to allow nonlinear variations
of the average-cost function.
3. The Data
This study is based on a combined time series and cross-sectional data set for
Swiss electricity distribution utilities over the period 1992-1996.5 The primary
sources were the Swiss Federal Office of Energy's “Finanzstatistik”; additional
data were collected using a mail questionnaire sent to the utilities. Part of the
companies listed in this sample, however, are not appropriate for the purpose of
our analysis because the amount of self-generated electricity is high. Since the
aim of this study is to analyze the cost structure of distribution, companies which
had an amount of self-generated electricity higher than 20% of the total sales were
excluded.6 The restrictions on data described above and the completed
questionnaires result in a sample of 45 electricity distribution utilities for which
appropriate data are available. All input prices, total cost and variable cost were
deflated to 1996 constant Swiss francs using the Swiss Consumer Price Index.
For simplicity, total distribution cost is equated to total expenditure as reported by
the companies excluding the expenditure for purchased electricity. Average yearly
wage rates are estimated as the labor expenditure divided by the number of
employees. Following Friedlaender and Wang Chang (1983) and Filippini and
Maggi (1993), the capital price is calculated from the residual capital costs
divided by the capital stock. Residual capital cost is total distribution cost minus
labor cost. According to Callan (1992), the capital stock is approximated by the
total installed transformer capacity, measured in kVA.7 Descriptive statistics of
these variables are presented in Table 1.
1. quartile median 3. quartile
AC average cost (Swiss cents/kWh) 5.7 7.7 9.4
Y electricity transported (GWh) 73 110 196
PL price labor (1000 Swiss francs/employee) 83 97 114
PC price capital (Swiss francs/kVA) 62 83 115
SLT share of low voltage electricity sales 59% 74% 89%
HVG high voltage grid (dummy) 0 0 1
OTSH share of other activities 4% 9% 17%
LF load factor 0.54 0.57 0.60
CD customer density (customers/hectare) 4 6 12
ODL output density, low voltage (kWh/customer) 6'192 6'756 7'353
ODM output density, medium voltage (MWh/customer) 1'222 2'350 3'500
Table 1 - Descriptive statistics
4. Estimation Results
With regard to choice of econometric technique, it should be noted that in the
econometric literature we can find various types of models focusing on cross-
sectional variation, i.e., heterogeneity across units. The three most widely used
approaches are: the OLS model, the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model,
and the error components model (EC). The fact that the average cost function (1)
includes explanatory variables that remain constant over time excludes the
possibility to estimate equation (2) by LSDV. Therefore, equation (2) has been
estimated using the OLS and the EC models.
In Table 2 the OLS and the EC estimates of the average cost function (2) are
presented. The estimated functions are well behaved. Most of the parameter
estimates are statistically significant and carry the expected sign. Moreover, the
coefficients of both models are similar.
OLS EC
coefficient t-ratio  coefficient  t-ratio
Constant 9.577280 *** 6.30 9.639780 *** 6.44
Y -0.004033 ** -2.68 -0.003831 * -2.57
Y2 0.000002 1.61 0.000002 1.56
PL 0.001440 0.36 0.001194 0.30
PC 0.030491 *** 9.41 0.030557 *** 9.54
SLT 2.866910 *** 3.69 2.501920 *** 3.30
HVG 1.597110 *** 5.08 1.600430 *** 5.04
OTSH 12.768100 *** 8.11 12.317600 *** 7.86
LF -10.546600 *** -4.65 -11.235400 *** -5.09
CD -0.058831 *** -3.50 -0.054928 *** -3.29
ODL -0.000217 * -2.15 -0.000129 -1.28
ODM -0.000074 * -2.21 -0.000083 * -2.52
TIME 0.092114 1.20 0.093182 1.04
Adj. R2 0.740 0.754
*, **, ***: significantly different from zero at the 95%, 99%, 99.9% confidence level.
Table 2 - Average-cost parameter estimates
To test whether individual effects are present we ran a Lagrange Multiplier test for
the random effects model. The result of this test favors the random effects model
over the OLS model. However, the estimated coefficients do not vary much
between the two specifications.
As expected, an increase in the load factor – i.e. smaller fluctuations of electricity
demand over time - will decrease average costs. This result indicates that to
improve the load factor, the Swiss electric utilities could more strongly
differentiate the time-of-use rates. Filippini (1997) shows a general
responsiveness of electricity consumption in the Swiss residential sector to
changes in peak and off-peak prices.
According to Roberts (1986), the inclusion of the number of customers and the
size of the service territory in the cost function of network industries allows for
the distinction of economies of output density, economies of customer density and
economies of scale. Economies of scale (ES) measure the reaction of costs to an
equal proportional increase in output, number of customers and size of the service
area. In terms of our model specification this is equal to an expansion of output,
holding output density and customer density constant. The average-cost elasticity
with respect to output Y can therefore be used directly to calculate economies of
scale. Economies of scale – the effect on average costs of an expansion of Y
holding ODL, ODM and CD constant - are defined by
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Economies of customer density (ECD) measure the reaction of costs to an equal
proportional increase of output and the number of customers, keeping holding the
size of the service area fixed. In terms of our model specification, this corresponds
to an equal proportional expansion of output and customer density, holding output
density constant. The average cost elasticity with respect to Y and CD can
therefore directly be used to calculate economies of customer density, as  follows
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Finally, economies of output density (EOD) measure the reaction of costs to an
increase in output holding the size of the service area and the number of customer
fixed. In terms of our model specification, this corresponds to an equal
proportional expansion of output  and output density, holding customer density
constant. The average cost elasticity with respect to Y, ODL and ODM can
therefore be directly used to calculate economies of output density, as  follows
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We will talk of economies of scale or density if ES, ECD or EOD are negative,
i.e. if an output expansion results in lower average costs. Accordingly, we will
talk of diseconomies of scale or density if ES, ECD or EOD are positive. No
economies or diseconomies exist if ES, ECD or EOD equal 0. All of these
definitions refer only to our average cost specification. The resulting economies of
scale and density at the median values of the sample are summarized in Table 3.
OLS EC
Economies of scale (ES) -0.052 -0.049
Economies of customer density (ECD) -0.099 -0.093
Economies of output density (EOD) -0.263 -0.187
Table 3 – Economies of scale and density at the median values of the sample
We find increasing returns to scale for the electricity distribution utilities in our
sample; a balanced increase in output, customers and area size of 10% decreases
average costs by 0.5%. In Figure 1 the scale expansion paths of the average costs
are shown. Most of the utilities in our sample therefore are too small and do not
reach the minimum efficient scale (the median utility delivers 110 GWh).
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Figure 1 - Scale expansion paths of the average costs for all three voltage levels
In addition, there are significant economies of customer density and economies of
output density. Average distribution costs fall the more densely populated a
service area is, and the higher the average consumption per customer (i.e. the
output density) is.
5. Using the Results for Yardstick Regulation
The estimation results can be used to predict the cost of the different voltage
levels of the distribution network. The costs for the high-, medium- and low-
voltage grids at the median values of the sample are shown in table 4.
OLS EC
high-voltage grid (between 40 kV and 220 kV) 1.60 1.60
medium-voltage grid (between 1 kV and 40 kV) 3.82 4.09
low-voltage grid (up to 1 kV) 2.87 2.50
Total distribution costs (all three voltage levels) 8.29 8.19
Table 4 – Estimated average costs per voltage level (in Swiss cents per kWh)
The regulator might use these costs as price-caps for the regulation of electricity
transport prices on the different distribution levels. However, these costs do not
incorporate the heterogeneity of electricity distribution utilities. The estimation
results in Table 2 suggest that the heterogeneity of output – the load factor,
customer density and output density – significantly influence average costs. Table
5 shows the estimated average-cost elasticities of the four heterogeneity variables
in our model.
OLS EC
Load factor -0.777 -0.8274
Customer density -0.047 -0.0438
Output density (low-voltage customers) -0.189 -0.1125
Output density (medium-voltage customers) -0.022 -0.0251
Table 5 – Estimated average-cost elasticities of service area characteristics
These estimates might be used by the regulator to calculate individual price-caps
for the different utilities that reflect the heterogeneity of their service area,
customers and demand characteristics. However, the size of the utilities – the
output Y – must not be included in the yardstick price calculation because it is not
a characteristic of the service area that cannot be altered by the firms. The
exclusion of Y gives the small utilities incentives to merge, because they can
decrease their costs due to increasing returns to scale.
The yardstick regulation of firms with heterogeneous outputs is only appropriate
if the observed characteristics allow the regulator to record most of the
heterogeneity. The adjusted determination coefficients of our estimations are
rather high, 0.74 and 0.75, suggesting that our model explains about 75% of the
variation of  average distribution costs.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have estimated an average-cost function for a panel of 45 Swiss
electricity distribution utilities as a basis for yardstick competition as suggested by
Shleifer for the regulation of network access prices. Unlike the existing literature,
we separated the sale function of a utility from the delivery function, and we did
not include variables that can be influenced by the firms. Moreover, several
variables measuring the heterogeneity of output were included in the model
specification.
In Switzerland, there is currently a debate on the deregulation of the electricity
market. In the Swiss Federal Office of Energy’s (1998) proposal for a new
electricity market bill (“Elektrizitätsmarktgesetz”). Distribution network owners
have to give access to their network only if there is excess capacity (Art. 4, par.
2). The pricing of TPA to the distribution network follows the traditional cost-of-
service regulation (Art. 5, par. 1). According to the proposal, therefore, each
distribution utility is allowed to set the delivery rate at the level of its individual
average cost. This proposal suffers from three main problems: First, if the network
owners pretend that there is no capacity available, it will be difficult for potential
network users to get access at all. Second, the cost-of-service regulation gives no
incentives to the network owners to increase their efficiency. Third, the regulator
does not use the fact that there are approximately 900 similar electricity
distribution utilities in Switzerland to reduce the asymmetric information
concerning the costs. We believe that the regulator could use the average cost
function estimated in this paper for yardstick regulation of the network access
prices and thus solving problems two and three.
The estimation results indicate the existence of economies of output and customer
density and economies of scale. A majority of the distribution utilities is not
producing at an efficient scale. Moreover, we were able to identify different
heterogeneity factors that affect average cost. These are the load factor, as well as
the customer density and the output density of different consumer groups.
Because this heterogeneity of the service areas cannot be altered by the
distribution utilities,  it has to be incorporated into the yardstick regulation.
Due to lack of data it was not possible to incorporate the service quality aspect of
electricity distribution in this paper. However, service quality and system security
must not be forgotten in the regulation of network utilities.
Endnotes
* The authors would like to thank the Swiss Federal Office of Energy – namely
Alfred Löhrer – and all the distribution utilities that responded to the
questionnaire for their cooperation. Also, we thank Michael Breuer for useful
suggestions.
1 Kittelsen (1995) and Weyman-Jones (1995) apply data envelopment analysis
(DEA) for the yardstick regulation of electricity distribution.
2 In our sample, the correlation coefficient between maximum demand and total
kWh sold is 0.99583; between the number of customers and total kWh sold it is
0.97745; and  between maximum demand and the number of customers it is
0.97984.
3 Some utilities only operate medium- and low-voltage grids and are connected
to a high-voltage grid that is operated by a different firm. The costs of this
high-voltage grid are, then, implicitly part of their electricity purchasing costs
and therefore not included in the network costs.
4 Unfortunately, it is not possible to separate the costs of other activities from the
network operation costs due to insufficient accounting data.
5 The Swiss electric power industry is composed of about 1200 firms, public and
private, that are engaged in the generation, transmission and/or distribution of
electric power. There is a great divergence both in terms of size and activities
of these companies. In particular, approximately 900 utilities, or 74% of the
total, are merely distributors of electric power. The municipals and the regional
electric utilities purchase most of their power from 10 utilities which form the
backbone of the industry.
6 Due to insufficient accounting data we do not have the possibility to separate
production and distribution cost.
7 Unfortunately, no data are available which would allow the calculation of the
capital stock using the perpetual inventory method.
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